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NOTES & COMMENTS
THE TRADEMARK DILUTION "SECRET" IS OUT:
THE FTDA AND THE SUPREME COURT LEAVE
VICTORIA'S SECRET AND FUTURE PLAINTIFFS
WITHOUT A LEGAL OR EQUITABLE REMEDY

I.

INTRODUCTION

The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the difference
between lightning and a lightning bug.

Mark Twain, Author'
Word Choice-it can have a great impact on the interpretation of a
contractual or statutory provision. Even erroneous usage of a semicolon may
2
cause misunderstandings or unfavorable results with a judge. While words may
have a singular and clear meaning to one reader, the same words may convey a
different meaning or may be ambiguous to another. Just as Mr. Twain carefully
worded his vibrant tales, it is also important when drafting agreements, court
opinions, or statutes to implement careful word choice. While there are many
unfortunate examples of unclear language in the legal world, the particular
example that this note discusses, originates from trademark law.
Historically, a trademark's "orthodox" '3 function has been "to identify the
4
origin or ownership of the goods [sic] to which [the trademark] is affixed.", This
statement of the law comes from the seminal discussion of trademark dilution, The
Rational Basis of TrademarkProtection,authored by Frank I. Schechter. In short,
federal trademark dilution is a theory of law that protects the distinctiveness of

1. The Quotations Page, Quotationsby Author, Mark Twain (1835 - 1910), http://www.quotations
page.com/quotesfMark-Twain/41 (accessed Sept. 13, 2004).
2. See e.g. NBC 4, News, Thanks to a Semicolon, Gays, Lesbians Keep Marrying, http://www.nbc4.
tv/news/2854381/detail.html (accessed Sept. 13, 2004). While some people may feel that the misuse of a
semicolon is a petty excuse to deny a requested order, it was a "big deal" to San Francisco Superior
Court Judge James Warren. Id. The order denied by the San Francisco Superior Court is a timely
example of careless drafting.
3. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 813
(1927).
4. Id. at 814 (quoting HanoverStar Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916)).
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famous marks.5 Distinctiveness is "the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services.",6 Schechter's article states that preservation of a
trademark's distinctiveness "should constitute the only rational basis for its
protection.' 7 In order to protect famous and distinctive marks, Congress passed
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA").8 This act provides for
injunctive relief against any commercial use that dilutes, i.e., lessens, the
distinctive quality of a famous mark.9 However, the FTDA allows money
damages only if willful intent is proven.' °

Unfortunately, the FTDA's language created some disagreement among the
circuit courts about the act's requirements." According to the FTDA, injunctive
relief may be obtained only against a commercial use that "causes dilution."'2

Given the nature of injunctive relief and other trademark laws, some courts
interpreted "causes dilution" to mean a "likelihood of dilution,"' 3 while other14
courts required a showing of actual harm in order to obtain an injunction.
Additionally, absent willful intent, money damages are not available, making
injunctive relief the sole remedy in these instances." Accordingly, some courts in
the process of interpreting the language of the FFDA have thwarted the very
purpose of the act: to prevent "subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the
[famous] mark[s] or tarnish or disparage [such marks], even in the absence of a
16
likelihood of confusion.'

In addition to problematic language within the FT7DA, the United States
Supreme Court has further debilitated the usefulness and purpose of the act. In

5. H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 2-3 (Nov. 30, 1995) (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029-30). While
the federal law limits its applicability to famous marks, many state dilution laws have no such
requirement. See e.g. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110 B, § 12 (1999).
6. H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030); J. Thomas McCarthy,
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition vol. 1, § 3:1, at 3-2 (4th ed., West 2004).
7. Schechter, supra n. 3, at 831.
8. 15 U.S.C § 1125(c) (2000). The FTDA provides in pertinent part:
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled . . . to an injunction against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the
mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark ....
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of a famous mark shall be
entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title unless the person
against whom an injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or
to cause dilution to the famous mark.
Id. at § 1125(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2003).
9. Id.
10. Id. at § 1125(c)(2).
11. Karen M. Kitterman, Federal Trademark Dilution Law: The New Landscape, 8 Cyberspace
Law. 5 (June 2003).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433
(2003) (emphasis in original).
13. E.g. Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands,Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999).
14. E.g. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999).
15. Steve Meleen, Susan J. Hightower & Martin Hernandez, Recent Developments in Trademark
Law: Elusive Dilution and Sorting the Resulting Confusion, 11 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 351, 355 (2003).
16. H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 2 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1029).
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Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,Inc.,17 the Court ruled that a plaintiff must prove
actual dilution, or actual harm, in order to obtain a preventive injunction.18 The
Court's extremely literal approach in Moseley struck down the widely accepted
likelihood of dilution standard. In addition, Moseley did nothing to allow money
damages without proof of willful intent.1 9
As discussed below, the inequitable remedial scheme under Moseley and the
FTDA leave a plaintiff uncompensated for an "injury to the economic value of a
famous mark., 20 Thus, in order to avoid such inequities and align the FTDA with
the principles of damages and injunctions, an amendment to the FTDA is needed.
Such an amendment should allow money damages as a remedy to the trademark
owner without the owner having to prove willful intent. In addition, the
amendment should establish a likelihood of dilution standard for obtaining
injunctive relief. Such an amendment would allow a plaintiff to obtain an
injunction before injury has actually occurred and be made whole if there is any
economic injury.
In order to promote clarity in the argument this note proffers, Section Two
provides useful background regarding trademarks in general, trademark dilution,
and the leading trademark dilution cases. Next, Section Three provides a general
look at the Moseley decision and the current status of the law concerning federal
trademark dilution actions. Section Four discusses relevant principles of damages
and injunctions, and challenges the Court's reasoning in Moseley based on those
principles. Finally, Section Five suggests an amended version of the FTDA,
followed by a brief conclusion in Section Six.

II.

BACKGROUND

While trademark law in general is aimed primarily at protecting the
consumer, trademark dilution law is aimed primarily at protecting the trademark
owner. 21 Congress enacted the FTDA in order to afford trademark owners
further protection against unauthorized uses of famous marks.22 However, before
the enactment of the FIDA, dilution was a state action, and dilution laws varied
throughout the states.23 The remedies for the owner of a diluted trademark were
"unpredictable and inadequate., 24 Furthermore, only about half of the states
25
recognized a cause of action, and obtaining nationwide relief was difficult. Thus,

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
1031).
25.

537 U.S. 418.
Id. at 433-34.
See id. at 432-34.
Id. at 422.
H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030); Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429.
H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 2-3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N at 1029-30).
Id. at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
Id. Many courts were reluctant to give proper relief. Id. at 4 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
Id. at 3-4 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030-31).
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Congress enacted the FTDA as a response to both the need for nationwide relief
and to modern national and international trade.26
A.

Trademark and Its Purpose

In short, a trademark is a name or slogan used by a person or company to
identify and distinguish the source of the goods.27 Specifically, the term trademark
is used to describe:
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof- (1) used by a
person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold
by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
28
source is unknown.
Buick,29 Kodak, ° and Victoria's Secret31 are examples of trademarks.
Trademarks differ from the "monopolistic grants" given in copyrights and
patents. 32 A trademark owner has two basic powers. First, a trademark owner
may prohibit another's attempts to sell products, using the trademark as a label.33
Second, a trademark owner may prohibit uses that seek to benefit from the good
will of the trademark. 34
Trademark law recognizes that consumers associate a certain quality of
product with a certain trademark.35
As Justice Frankfurter stated, "[t]he
protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of
symbols."36 Trademark law has a two-fold purpose.37 First, trademark law
protects public confidence that when buying a product labeled with a familiar
trademark, one is indeed buying the desired product.3 8 Second, trademark law
prohibits misappropriation of a trademark holder's goodwill by "pirates and
cheats. 3 9 Thus, traditional trademark law is aimed primarily at protecting
consumers. 40

26. H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 3-4 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030-31).

27. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
28. Id.
29. H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).

30. Id.
31. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.

32. 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
36. Id.; 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1274.
37. 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1274.
38. Id.; Susan Thomas Johnson, Internet Domain Name and Trademark Disputes: Shifting
Paradigmsin Intellectual Property, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 465, 470 (2001).
39. 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1274; Johnson, supra n. 38, at 470.
40. See supra nn. 38-39.
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B.

Distinctiveness

In order for a mark to qualify for trademark protection, some level of
distinctiveness is required. 4 ' Trademark protection increases as distinctiveness
43
increases. 2 Generally, the spectrum of distinctiveness has four categories.
Those categories are as follows: generic marks, descriptive marks, suggestive
marks, and arbitrary and fanciful marks.44
Generic marks are the lowest form of distinctiveness.45 These marks merely
name the object associated with the mark. 6 An example of a generic mark would48
47
object.
be the use of the word "CAR., This mark merely names the associated
Generic marks are completely without distinctiveness.49 Since some level of
distinctiveness is required for trademark protection, generic marks are also
ineligible for protection. ° This arrangement allows competitors to refer to their
own products by the generic term. 5'52 Thus, Chevrolet can still use the word
"CAR" when referring to its products.
The next step up in distinctiveness is descriptive marks. 3 These marks, as
4
a
An example of 55
one might intuitively guess, merely describe the product.
market.
fish
a
with
conjunction
in
used
symbol
fish
a
is
descriptive mark
Descriptive marks may become distinctive through consumer recognition. 6 When
consumers equate a particular mark with the specific products of the mark's user,
are
that particular mark has acquired secondary meaning.57 Descriptive 5marks
8
meaning.'
'secondary
acquired
have
"they
if
only
eligible for protection
Third in the spectrum of distinctiveness are suggestive marks. 9 Suggestive
is associated. 60
marks, not surprisingly, suggest qualities of the product to which it
An example of a suggestive mark is "GLOW" by Glow, Inc, for the company's
perfume products.61 Suggestive marks are more distinctive than descriptive marks

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Glow Indus., Inc. v. Lopez, 252 F. Supp. 2d 962, 977 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
Id. at 215-16; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 976.
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215-16; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 976.
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.

47. Id.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
See id.
Id.
Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
See id. at 978.
See id. at 977.
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
Id.
Id.; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 976.
Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
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and are allowed trademark protection without acquiring secondary meaning.62
Suggestive marks, however, are given less protection than arbitrary and fanciful
marks.63
64
The highest level of distinctiveness is that of arbitrary and fanciful marks.

Arbitrary and fanciful marks hold no "logical relationship" of any kind between
the product and the mark.65 Yet, "even within the category of arbitrary or fanciful
marks, there is still a substantial range of distinctiveness. 66 Arbitrary marks
remain at a lower level of distinctiveness because of the common nature or
frequent use of the word.67 For example, "Black & White" 68 scotch whiskey holds
the rank of "arbitrary,

69

because the mark utilizes "words commonly used in the

70

English language.,
Fanciful marks, however, are of the highest degree of
distinctiveness. 7' These marks are figments of the imagination because they are
made up. 72 Fanciful marks "evoke no associations [of] human experience...
[with] the product. 7 3 A prime example of a fanciful 74mark would be "Clorox"
bleach, as the mark consists of "wholly made-up terms.,
C.

Trademark Infringement

Once it is determined that either a trademark is inherently distinctive, or it
has acquired secondary meaning, it is eligible for protection. 75 Trademark
protection is important because it allows the general consumer to have confidence

that one is in fact buying a certain brand or quality of product.76 Such consumer
confidence would not be possible without trademark protection.77

Trademark

infringement actions have been the traditional way of protecting a trademark.78
The gravamen of a trademark infringement action is whether consumers will likely
confuse the junior mark with the senior mark.79
62. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977. Marks that are of suggestive quality or
higher, are marks that are "inherently distinctive." Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977. Marks which are
inherently distinctive are allowed trademark protection without acquiring secondary meaning. See id.
63. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216.
64. Id.; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
65. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
66. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
71. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216.
72. Id.; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
73. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216.
74. Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
75. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215-16; Glow, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 977; McCarthy, supra n. 6, at vol. 2,
§ 11:2,11-5 to 11-6.
76. Johnson, supra n. 38, at 470.
77. 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1274.
78. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 428-29.
79. Mar. Madness Athletic Assn., L.L.C. v. Natl. CollegiateAthletic Assn., 310 F. Supp. 2d 786, 812
(N.D. Tex. 2003). "Junior use" is a term commonly used to denote the subsequent user, i.e., the user of
a mark the same as or similar to the mark of the senior user. Id. Likewise, "junior mark" denotes the
mark which is subsequent to the senior mark. Id.
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TrademarkDilution

8
While trademark infringement produces immediate harm, 0 trademark
dilution produces incremental harm described as "an infection which, if allowed to
spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark."'', Accordingly,
Congress defined dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of-(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 8 Thus, trademark dilution
differs from trademark infringement. Competition and confusion
83 elements of
• are
••
claim.
dilution
a trademark infringement claim, but not a trademark
The F-FDA provides that "[tihe owner of a famous mark shall be entitled...
to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark.
• . if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark."' Accordingly, the prima facie case requirements
for trademark dilution are as follows:
(1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) [the senior mark] must be distinctive; (3)
the junior use must be a commercial use ... ; (4) [the commercial use] must begin
and (5) [the
famous;
after the senior mark has. become
85 commercial use] must cause
.
..
.
dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark.

Thus, in order to qualify for protection under the FTDA, a mark must be not only
86
famous, but also distinctive. 86 It has been argued that the FTDA protects only the
87
most famous marks.
88
The
Trademark dilution can occur by either blurring or tarnishing.
following examples illustrate the importance of protection from trademark
dilution. Dilution by blurring diminishes the famous mark's capacity to identify
goods uniquely.89 Blurring encompasses the "classic or 'traditional' form of

"Senior mark" is a term commonly used to denote the original famous mark. Id. Likewise, a
"senior user" is the owner of such a mark. Id. There are many factors involved in determining
whether an authorized use constitutes trademark infringement. However, those factors are beyond the
scope of the paper.
80. H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
81. Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 3
(reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added).
83. Fed. Express, Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 175 (2d Cir. 2000); Nabisco, 191 F.3d at
219 ("Consumer confusion-the nub of an action for infringement-is, of course, unnecessary to show
the actionable dilution of a famous mark.").
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
85. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
87. Oral Arguments at 28, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (also located at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/01-1015.pdf).
88. Julie A. Rajzer, Misunderstanding the Internet: How Courts are Overprotecting Trademarks
Used in Metatags, 2001 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 427, 435; McCarthy, supra n. 6, at vol. 4, §§ 24:68-69,
104, at 24-129 to 24-130, 24-248 to 24-252.
89. McCarthy, supra n. 6, at vol. 4, § 24:68, 24-129.
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Examples of dilution by blurring would be "Dupont shoes, Buick

aspirin ... [or] Kodak pianos." 91 These are cases where consumers are not likely

to believe that Dupont is making or sponsoring the shoes, 92 nor would the
consumer likely confuse Buick cars with Buick aspirin. 93 Rather, consumers
would be less likely to believe that "the [senior] mark signifies something unique,
singular, or particular." 94 Thus, these uses would not likely satisfy the likelihood
of confusion test in an infringement action. 95
Dilution by tarnishing portrays famous marks in unwholesome contexts
96
likely causing consumers to associate unbecoming thoughts with the senior mark.
Tarnishing can also occur when substandard products are linked to famous
marks. 97 An example of tarnishing might be the use of the mark "KING
VELVEEDA" as a sexually graphic website. 98 Such a use would likely "conflict
with the image that [Kraft Foods] has successfully cultivated .. . as a wholesome,
family oriented [sic] product." 99 The harm in this instance "corro[des] ... the

reputation and good will [the senior mark] once enjoyed."' ° Accordingly, this use
would not likely satisfy the likelihood of confusion test in an infringement
action.1 '
The above examples illustrate the need for protection of famous marks from
dilution as a distinct action from infringement. Without an action for dilution, a
trademark owner who cannot satisfy the likelihood of confusion test is left
vulnerable to "pirates and cheats. ' '1 2 With each unauthorized use of Buick,
Kodak, or Velveeta, the distinctiveness of the famous mark is lessened. If allowed
to continue, the mark would no longer be distinctive.'0 3
Unfortunately, the language of the FTDA does not effectively achieve its
purpose, which is to prevent dilution by blurring or tarnishing a famous mark."' 4
The FTDA provides an injunction only if the authorized use "causes dilution."' 0 '
The FTDA further provides that injunctive relief is to be administered according

90. Joseph J. Galvano, Student Author, There Is No "Rational Basis" For Keeping It a "Secret"
Anymore: Why the FTDA's "Actual Harm" Requirement Should Not Be Interpreted the Same Way for
Dilution Caused by Blurringas It Is for Dilution Caused by Tarnishing,31 Hofstra L. Rev. 1213, 1226
(2003); McCarthy, supra n. 6, at vol. 4, § 24:68, 24-129.
91. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994); Galvano, supra n. 90, at 1226;
H.R. Rep. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
92. See H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. McCarthy, supra n. 6, at vol. 4, § 24:104, 24-248; Galvano, supra n. 90, at 1228.
97. McCarthy, supra n. 6, at vol. 4, § 24:104, 24-249; Gatvano, supra n. 90, at 1228-29.
98. Galvano, supran. 90, at 1230.
99. Id. (quoting Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2002)).
100. Id. (quoting Kraft, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 950).
101. See H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
102. 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1274; see H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
103. See Oral Arguments at 32-33, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
104. See H.R. Rpt. 104-374 at 2 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1029).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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to 15 U.S.C. § 111 6 ,1°6
which allows an injunction "to prevent a violation [of the
FTDA]."'' Thus, the language within the FTDA, describing when an injunction
should issue, is inconsistent.
The FTDA provision for damages, which requires willful intent on the part
of the defendant, reveals further problems. 1' Only after an owner of a famous
mark shows willful intent may such owner obtain, subject to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a),
profits gained by the defendant, damages incurred, and costs. 109 While willful
intent is usually required before a court will award punitive damages," 0 willful
intent is not typically an element of actual damages as provided in section
1117(a)."
E.

The Split among the CircuitCourts-Actual Dilution v. Likelihood of
Dilution

In light of conflicting language in the FTDA, the circuit courts disagreed as
to the standard of dilution needed in order to succeed on a claim." 2 Some courts
indicated a likelihood of dilution standard could be used to obtain injunctive
relief." 3 However, other courts, based on statutory interpretation, required actual

harm to the economic value of the mark to obtain an injunction." 4

Briefly

discussing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development". and Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,116 two

cases which set the stage for Moseley, is helpful in understanding the current status
of the law.

106. Id. at § 1125(c)(2).
107. Id. at § 1116(a) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
108. ld. at §§ 1117(a) 1125(a), (c)(1)-(2) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
109. Id. at §§ 1117(a), 1125(c)(2). In addition, subject to 15 U.S.C. § 1118, such owner may obtain
the destruction of the infringing materials. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1118, 1125(c)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
Furthermore, in exceptional cases, the victorious party may obtain reasonable attorney's fees. Id. at §§
1117(a), 1125(c)(2).
110. Dan B. Dobbs, Law Of Remedies Damages-Equity-Restitution 218 (2d ed., West 1993)
[hereinafter Dobbs, Law of Remedies] (The questioned conduct "must involve some bad state of
mind."); Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook On The Law Of Remedies-Damages-Equity-Restitution4 (West
1973) [hereinafter Dobbs, Handbook] (Punitive damages operate "to condemn seriously bad
conduct.").
111. See infra nn. 225-306 and accompanying text; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
112. Kitterman, supra n. 11, at 5. Compare FederalExpress, 201 F.3d at 177 (using the language "will
dilute the distinctiveness of... [the] famous senior mark," indicates a likelihood of dilution standard)
(quoting Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 222); Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223 ("To require proof of actual [dilution] ...
seems inappropriate."); Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306-07 (D.N.J. 1998) (using future
oriented words such as "will dilute ... would be at [defendant's] mercy and could be associated with
[defendant]" indicates a likelihood of dilution standard) (emphasis added) with Ringling, 170 F.3d at
459 (The FTDA "requir[es] proof of actual harm.") (emphasis added).
113. See e.g. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-25.
114. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 453, 464.
115. 170 F.3d 449.
116. 191 F.3d 208.
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Ringling-Actual Dilution Standard

When a court requires proof of actual dilution, proof of actual consummated

harm is required to succeed in an action for trademark dilution." 7 In Ringling, the
dispute centered around Utah Travel Division's ("Utah") use of the phrase "The
Greatest Snow On Earth." 8 Utah used the phrase on license plates and in
tourism promotions, which Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey ("Ringling") claimed
diluted its mark, "The Greatest Show On Earth."' 9 It was undisputed that
Ringling's mark was famous.'20 It was also undisputed that Utah made use of the
phrase well after Ringling's mark became famous. 12' The only issue as to22
blurring.
trademark dilution was whether Utah's use diluted Ringling's mark by
The circuit court agreed with the district court that Utah's use did not dilute
Ringling's mark. 23
First, the court began its discussion of the FTDA with an in-depth look at
the history behind the concept of dilution. 2' The court noted that dilution as a
separate cause of action from infringement is attributed often to Frank I.
Schechter. 12' Schechter's model of dilution "recognize[d] that 'the preservation of
the uniqueness of a trademark . . . constitute[d] the only rational basis for its
protection,' and [such protection was] provide[d] . . . by prohibiting 'dilution' of

such a mark's uniqueness."' 26 In Schechter's view, only the most unique marks
127
Unique marks in this context means "those
would be eligible for protection.
[marks] employing 'coined, arbitrary or fanciful words or phrases.",128 Under
Schechter's model, dilution meant any identical or practically identical junior use
of a senior mark, which harmfully affects the uniqueness of the senior mark,
without a requirement of confusion or competition."'

117. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464-65.
118. Id. at 451 (emphasis omitted).
119. Id. Note that "The Greatest Show On Earth" is a slogan. Id. In order to gain trademark
protection for a slogan, normally the party seeking protection must show that the slogan has acquired
secondary meaning. See Morgan Creek Prod., Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 1991 WL 352619 *2
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1991); supra nn. 56-58. Ringling used the "Greatest Show" slogan since 1872.
Ringling, 170 F.3d at 451. In 1961, Ringling registered its slogan with the Federal Patent and
Trademark Office. Id. Most people associate "The Greatest Show On Earth" with Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey. Id. at 462-63.
120. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 452.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 463.
124. Id. at 453.
125. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 453.
126. Id. at 454 (quoting Schechter, supra n. 3, at 831) (citation omitted).
127. ld.
128. Id. (quoting Schechter, supra n. 3, at 829).
129. Id. Under Schechter's model, "no proof would be required to prove dilution except the fact that
a junior mark replicated the protected mark." Ringling, 170 F.3d at 456. The court in Ringling
hesitated to adopt this approach for fear it would "create [trademark] rights in gross... comparable...
to patent and copyright." ld. However, even the Moseley decision recognized the fact that the FTDA
contains First Amendment protections which will not allow such impediments on free speech or
competition. 537 U.S. at 431; infra n. 132. Moseley further notes that an identical use of a senior mark
might be reliable circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove dilution. Id. at 434.
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Second, the court in Ringling noted that state courts were reluctant to apply
the state dilution statutes early on.1 3 Many times the state courts required a
showing of a likelihood of confusion, in spite of statutory language to the
contrary.3

Initially, courts were concerned that the state dilution statutes would

give trademark owners the ability to "monopolize language and inhibit
133 free
competition.132 Eventually, however, dilution did gain judicial acceptance.

The

New York Court of Appeals described dilution as a "cancer-like growth of

dissimilar products or services which feeds upon the business reputation of an
established distinctive trade-mark."' 134
The court in Ringling continued its analysis of the FTDA by contrasting it
with the state dilution statutes.1 35 The most distinguishable factor was the
difference between the likelihood of dilution standard in the state statutes and the
causes dilution standard in the federal statute. 36

This difference implied a

1 37

Furthermore, the court opined that Congress
completed harm requirement.
made the federal statute different from the state statutes purposefully, intending

In addition, the court in Ringling seems to give undue attention to "confusion." Ringling, 170
F.3d at 455, 457, 463. In fact, the court affirms the district court's interpretation of the FTDA, one
which requires that proof demonstrate some mistake or confusion. Id. at 463. However, confusion is
not an element of a federal dilution claim. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The FTDA closely mirrors
Schechter's model in this respect. Compare Schechter, supra n. 3, at 825-26 with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c),
1127. The FTDA is concerned with protecting distinctiveness "regardless of the presence or absence
of-(1) competition... or (2) likelihood of confusion." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added). Much like
Congress was concerned with preventing the infection of a mark's distinctiveness, H.R. Rep. 104-374 at
3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030), Schechter was concerned with uses that would "whittle
away" the uniqueness of a mark. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 456. Apparently, the court in Ringling failed to
notice these similarities when conjuring its actual dilution requirement.
130. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 455. The first state anti-dilution statute was enacted by Massachusetts. Id.
at 454. Throughout the next fifty years, approximately half of the states enacted anti-dilution statutes.
Id. Additionally, the court stated that all these anti-dilution statutes had four things in common:
(1) [the statutes] defined the category of marks protected against dilution solely by reference
to their "distinctive quality"; (2) [the statutes] proscribed not just actual, consummated
dilution, but the "likelihood of dilution"; (3) [the statutes] contain[ed] no express reference
to harm to the senior mark's economic value, [and] they defined dilution in terms susceptible
to the interpretation that it consisted solely of a loss of the mark's distinctiveness; and (4)
[the statutes] provided only injunctive relief.
Id. The court noted that this was the backdrop against which Congress enacted the FTDA. Id.
131. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 455.
132. Id. It has been argued that trademark dilution laws inhibit First Amendment rights. Moseley,
537 U.S. at 431. However, when the FTDA was passed, Congress created exceptions to ensure First
Amendment protection. Id. The FTDA contains a "[flair use" exception, a "[nioncommercial use"
exception, and a "news commentary" exception. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A)-(C).
133. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 455. However, the court in Ringling argued that courts have had a difficult
time grasping the concept of dilution, supporting its argument by the fact that state courts typically
define the harm of dilution vaguely as "dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark." Id. (quoting N.Y.
Gen. Bus. Law § 360-1 (McKinney Supp. 2004)). The court stated "dilution [sic] remains a somewhat
nebulous concept." Id. (quoting Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983)).
As further support, the court argued that if dilution is given a definition other than the one proposed
by Schechter, it "lose[s] its coherence... [and] becomes difficult to identify." Id. at 455-56.
134. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 455 (quoting Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977)).
135. Id. at 458.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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13
that the plaintiff prove economic harm in order to succeed in a dilution action. 8
Thus, the
Ringling court reached the conclusion that the FTDA required actual
9
13

harm.

2.

Nabisco-Likelihood of Dilution Standard

In contrast to Ringling, when a court requires a likelihood of dilution, a
plaintiff may show such likelihood through circumstantial evidence. 4 ° In Nabisco,
Pepperidge Farm, Inc. ("Pepperidge") made goldfish-shaped crackers with a
cheese flavor and an orange color. 141 Nabisco, Inc. ("Nabisco") also made a
similar product,142 which Pepperidge demanded that Nabisco cease and desist from
producing. 143 Nabisco then sued Pepperidge for declaratory relief, asking the
court to determine that their goldfish-shaped crackers did not violate any of
Pepperidge's rights. 144 Pepperidge then brought a counterclaim against Nabisco
under the FTDA. 145 The court concluded that Pepperidge could likely succeed on

a dilution claim against Nabisco, and thus should be entitled to a preliminary
injunction. 146
The Nabisco court did not require actual harm. 147 The court reasoned that
"[t]o require proof of actual loss of revenue seems inappropriate.' 4 4 After all, a
trademark owner might not be able to show a decrease in income at any point,
even in an obvious case of dilution. 14' Furthermore, proving that the loss was

138. Id.
139. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 458.
140. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
141. Id. at 212. The crackers were sold in a bag or a box under the name "Goldfish." Id. Pepperidge
had used the Goldfish mark continuously since 1962. Id. Between 1995 and 1998, Pepperidge spent
approximately $120 million marketing the Goldfish product in the United States. Id. at 213. Sales of
the Goldfish product were approximately $200 million per year. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 213. Pepperidge
was the second largest seller in terms of sales volume and the number one seller in terms of dollars. Id.
142. In 1998, Nabisco teamed up with Nickelodeon Television to make a product based on the
cartoon "CatDog." Id. The product featured orange crackers shaped in the form of a two-headed
character, half dog, and half cat. Id. The cat half preferred fish as its favorite meal, and the dog half
preferred bones. Id. Thus, the product contained small orange crackers in the shape of bones and fish
in addition to the CatDog. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 213. However, Pepperidge's fish was smaller and less
flat then that of Nabisco's. Id. A picture of Nabisco's fish was included on the box as a part of the
background. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 213. Pepperidge also brought claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) for
infringement as well as a state law dilution claim and unfair competition under New York law. Id. The
district court for the Southern District of New York granted the preliminary injunction for the state
and federal dilution claims but not for the infringement claim or the unfair competition claim. Id.
Nabisco appealed to the second circuit. Id. at 214.
146. Id. at 228-29. The court in Nabisco discussed the different types of marks, namely generic,
descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary and fanciful, which go to the distinctiveness of the mark. Nabisco,
191 F.3d at 215-16; see discussion on distinctiveness, supra nn. 41-74. The court determined that
Pepperidge had a moderately distinctive mark, given the fact that many food producers use animal
shapes. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217.
147. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 208.
148. Id. at 223.
149. Id. at 223-24.
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caused by a defendant's use would be "extraordinarily speculative.' 5 ° Also,
1 51
circumstantial evidence has historically been allowed to establish infringement.
Trademark owners should not have to show actual lost income or draft expensive
consumer surveys to demonstrate such loss. 1 2 Rather, there is "no reason why
[circumstantial evidence] should not be used to prove dilution.' ' 53 Thus, the court
in Nabisco determined that in the context of the FTDA, a plaintiff
should be able
15 4
to rely on circumstantial evidence in order to prove dilution.
Moreover, the Nabisco court reasoned that the Ringling court's reading of
the FTDA was an extremely literal approach, which defeated the purpose of the
statute.'55 If a plaintiff has to show actual consummated dilution, this would
require showing lost income and, in some instances, showing that the junior user
was an established business. 56 Under this view, the FTDA could not be asserted
until after the injury.'57 Furthermore, "because the [FTDA] provides only for an
injunction and no damages (absent willfulness) . . .such injury would never be

compensated.'' 58

Accordingly, the court in Nabisco reasoned that "it seems

59
plausibly within Congress's ...inten[t] ... to prevent the harm before it occurs." 1

Thus, the court concluded that under the FTDA, a plaintiff should have to prove
only a likelihood of dilution. '60
In addition, the court noted that an actual consummated harm requirement
also poses risky implications for potential junior users of a particular mark.' 6
Parties planning to make use of a mark would not be able to effectively seek
162
declaratory judgment prior to launching a particular product or business.
Instead, junior users would have to spend large amounts of money without
knowing whether their mark will be enjoined. 16' Thus, a likelihood of dilution
standard is beneficial not only for the senior mark owner, but also for the
potential junior user. 64

150. Id. at 224.
151. Id. at 224.
152. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 224. In commenting on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Ringling, the Nabisco court noted
that there were two possible meanings to Ringling's holding for actual dilution. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at
223. One view, the more narrow view, would be that a plaintiff could not merely rely on circumstantial
evidence to prove dilution. Id. Rather, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to present evidence of
actual lost revenue and consumer surveys. Id. The second view, and broader view, would require not
only lost revenue, but also "that the junior [user] be already established in the marketplace before" an
injunction is sought. Id. at 224. Nevertheless, the Nabisco court rejected both views. Id. at 224-25.
157. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
158. Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted).
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 224-25.
161. Id. at 224.
162. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
163. Id.
164. See id.
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Resolving the conflict in the circuit courts, the Supreme Court in a
unanimous decision held that a plaintiff must prove "actual dilution" in order to
obtain an injunction. a65 In Moseley, Victor and Cathy Moseley owned a retail
store called "Victor's Little Secret" in Elizabethtown, Kentucky.' 66 The Moseleys

initially opened their store under the name of "Victor's Secret" in February of
1998, claiming that they had never heard of Victoria's Secret. 167 The Moseleys

changed the name of their store later that month to Victor's Little Secret after
receiving a cease and desist letter from the affiliated corporations ("Victoria's
Secret") that own the "Victoria's Secret" trademark. 168 Victor's Little Secret sold
sex toys, 169 "novelties," and handcuffs in addition to lingerie, pornographic
'
videos,'7 0 and other "tawdry merchandise."171

Victoria's Secret operated over 750 stores around the country and spent over
$55 million on advertising its mark in 1998.172 Additionally, Victoria's Secret's
sales exceeded $1.5 billion.' 73 Victoria's Secret sold "high quality, [and]

attractively designed lingerie.' ' 174 While there were no Victoria's Secret stores in
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, Victoria's Secret distributed 400 million copies of its
catalogue, which included 39,000 copies in Elizabethtown. 75

Victoria's Secret found the Moseleys' change from Victor's Secret to Victor's
Little Secret unsatisfactory. 7 6 Thereafter, in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky, Victoria's Secret asserted claims against the
Moseleys for federal trademark infringement, unfair competition under federal
and state laws, and federal trademark dilution."7 The district court granted

165. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 419-20, 433-34.
166. Id. at 422.
167. V Secret Catalogue,Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2001). The fact of whether or not
the Moseleys had in fact heard of Victoria's Secret is important only to the question of willful intent.
Id. at 477. It is certainly hard to contemplate any man alive in the United States who has not heard of
Victoria's Secret. Moreover, I feel quite confident, though I have never been, that even people in
Elizabethtown, Kentucky have television, internet, radios, and telephone devices informing them of
the world around them. With all of today's technology, it is highly unlikely that even people in
Smalltown, USA have not heard of Victoria's Secret at least once.
While Mr. Moseley should have the liberty to use his own name in the title of his store, he
should not have the liberty to misappropriate the mark "Victoria's Secret." There are endless
possibilities from which Mr. Moseley could have chosen, e.g., "Victor's Tawdry Toys," "Victor's Lewd
Lace & Lingerie," or "Victor's One Stop Smut Shop." While these may not be the most attractive
options, it is undisputable that many options were available to the Moseleys. Moreover, an individual
should not be able to misappropriate another's trademark based upon the pretext that the mark
includes the individual's name.
168. Id. at 466-67.
169. Id. at 466.
170. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 424 n. 4.
171. Id. at 423.
172. Id. at 422.
173. Id. at 423.
174. Id. at 422.
175. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422-23.
176. V Secret, 259 F.3d at 467.
177. V Secret Catalogue,Inc. v. Moseley, 2000 WL370525 at **2-5 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2000).
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summary judgment in favor of Victoria's Secret on the federal trademark dilution
claim 78 and granted summary judgment in favor of the Moseleys as to the
infringement and unfair competition claims.

79

In its opinion, the district court noted that evidence of a likelihood of
consumer confusion is the gravamen of trademark infringement claims and unfair
competition claims.' 8° However, since Victoria's Secret failed to present any such
evidence, summary judgment was granted in favor of the Moseleys as to
infringement and unfair competition."'
The district court found that the mark "Victoria's Secret" was most certainly
famous, that the Moseleys were making a commercial use of the mark, and that
8 2
the Moseleys' use came well after the mark "Victoria's Secret" became famous.
The question at the trial court
was whether the use of "Victor's Little Secret"
183
diluted "Victoria's Secret.,
The district court found "Victor's Little Secret" sufficiently similar to
"Victoria's Secret" since the words "Victor's" and "Secret" were substantially
84
bigger than the word "Little," which seemed like an advertising afterthought.'
Furthermore, the district court found that "Victor's Little Secret" had a tarnishing
effect because of its "unsavory goods.' ' 185 Thus, the district court concluded that
the use of the mark "Victor's Little Secret" diluted the mark "Victoria's Secret."1 6
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the
"Victoria's Secret" mark had been diluted. 87 While the circuit court agreed with
the district court, it adopted the Nabisco test, which added the requirement that
the senior mark must be not only famous, but also distinctive. 88 The circuit court
found the mark "Victoria's Secret" to be "arbitrary and fanciful," a mark of the
highest degree of distinctiveness. 89 It supported its view by noting that the words
"Victoria's Secret" do not automatically trigger thoughts of lingerie, except in the
context of Victoria's Secret products' 9° In addition, the circuit court found the
fact that "no consumer is likely to go to [Victor's Little Secret] expecting to
find... [the] famed Miracle Bra"' 91 is tantamount to the distinction between
infringement and dilution: no consumer confusion is required. 12 Thus, the circuit

178. Id. at *6.
179. Id. at *4.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. V Secret, WL 370525 at *5.
183. Id.
184, Id.
185. Id. at *6 (quoting Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir.
1994)).
186. Id.
187. V Secret, 259 F.3d at 466.
188. Id. at 468-69.
189. Id. at 470.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 477.
192. V Secret, 259 F.3d at 477.
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court found
this to be the "classic instance of dilution by tarnishing ... and...
193
blurring.'

Subsequently, the Moseleys appealed to the Supreme Court, where the only
dispute at issue was whether Victoria's Secret had shown that the use of the mark
"Victor's Little Secret" caused "actual injury to the economic value of [the]
famous mark"'194 "Victoria's Secret," and what type of evidence would be needed
in order to constitute such a showing. 195 The Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court's holding that the mark "Victoria's Secret" had been diluted, and remanded
for further proceedings. 196 Since there was no evidence as to the economic impact
the mark "Victor's Little Secret" had on the mark "Victoria's Secret," the
Supreme Court concluded that Victoria's Secret was not entitled to summary
judgment on the dilution claim.' 97
A.

The Majority Opinion

The Court began its discussion of the actual dilution issue by stipulating that
the "Victoria's Secret" mark was "unquestionably valuable,"' 9 a finding the
Moseleys did not dispute. While the district court concluded that the mark
"Victor's Little Secret" diluted the mark "Victoria's Secret" by tarnishing, the
Supreme Court questioned whether tarnishing was embraced by the FTDA. 99
The Moseley Court compared the FTDA to state statutes, such as the
Massachusetts dilution law.2' ° Massachusetts' dilution law explicitly referred "to
both 'injury to business reputation' and to 'dilution of the distinctive quality of a
trade name or trademark,' 20 1 however, the FTDA made no reference to business
reputation.202 Thus, the Court concluded that a lack of any reference to business
reputation in the FTDA supported a narrower reading of federal trademark
dilution claims.203
In addition, Massachusetts' dilution law was based on a "likelihood" of
injury as opposed to "actual" injury, or dilution as worded in the FTDA. 204 The
Court noted that many sections in the Lanham Act, other than the FTDA, used
193. Id.
194. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422.
195. Id. at 422, 432-34; Oral Arguments at 3-4, 21, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418; Petrs. Br. on the Merits at i,
21-23, 28, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418; Br. for Respt. at 9, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
196. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 432.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 430, 432. The Massachusetts dilution law provided in pertinent part:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade
name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of trade-mark
infringement or unfair competition notwithstanding the absence of competition between the
parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 430 (quoting 1947 Mass. Acts 300).
201. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432; 1947 Mass. Acts 300.
202. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 430, 432.
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the term "likelihood of harm," instead of actual completed harm. 2 5 The Court
compared two phrases: first, a reference to a "lessening of the capacity a famous
mark" within the definition of dilution and a later reference to a "likelihood of
confusion, mistake, or deception, ''206 within a qualification to dilution. The Court
supported its actual harm requirement by reasoning that the word "likelihood" in
the definition of dilution was purposefully omitted.0 7
Although the Court interpreted the statute to require actual dilution,

tangible losses in sales or profits need not be proven. 2°8 Nevertheless, direct
evidence, such as consumer surveys demonstrating loss2°9 of economic value, 210 211
is
required if actual dilution cannot be proven through circumstantial evidence.
An example of sufficient circumstantial evidence might be a case when both
"junior and senior marks are identical., 212 However, the marks were not
identical," 3 and the Court required actual economic injury to be shown, but did
not require the economic "consequences" to be shown.214
Furthermore, the Court found additional support for its decision in the fact
that the expert witness for Victoria's Secret did not show that the mark "Victor's
21
Little Secret" had any impact on the strength of the mark "Victoria's Secret., 1
The Court concluded that there was "a complete [lack] of evidence of any" actual
dilution.216 The court ended its discussion of the issue by noting that while

205. Id. at 432. Other sections of the Lanham Act require there to be a likelihood of confusion. As
earlier noted, likelihood of confusion is not an element required under the FTDA. It might, however,
be reasonable to infer that confusion of the marks could act as evidence of dilution where an
infringement claim could not be successfully brought. Accordingly, there seems to be much confusion
in the Justices' remarks that follow:
Well ...suppose ... that the people who go to Victor's [Secret] who have ever heard of it
honestly do not believe the less in any respect whatsoever of Victoria's Little Secret, and the
people who use Victoria's Little-I mean ... the people who ... go to Victoria's Little
Secret have never heard of Victor's [Secret] ....
Question: You're confusing the marks.
Question: Now ...I understand you're confusing the marks. No, you're not confusing the
marks. No. I'm-he's saying I'm confusing the marks.
(Laughter.)
Oral Arguments at 40-41, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
206. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127) (emphasis added).
207. See id. at 432-33.
208. Id. at 433. This reasoning is rather troublesome when considered in the light of the Supreme
Court's phrasing of the issue at hand, i.e., "whether... actual injury to the economic value of a famous
mark ... is a requisite for relief under the FTDA." Id. at 422 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 434.
210. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422.
211. Id. at 434.
212. Id.; see Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 2003 WL 22451731 *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003) (illustrating
the quagmire that Moseley has created). Despite specific language to the contrary in Moseley, the
judge in Savin refused to find dilution even though the junior and senior marks were identical. Id.
213. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422-23.
214. Id. at 433.
215. Id. at 434.
216. Id.
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consumer surveys or other proof of actual dilution might be difficult to obtain, this
was not a reason to grant relief without proof of the statutory element.2 7
B.

The ConcurringOpinion

While the majority opinion stated that actual dilution must be shown in
order to succeed on a dilution claim, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion was

inconsistent with this view. According to Justice Kennedy, when construing the
FTDA, close examination of the term "capacity" in the definition of trademark

dilution should be afforded. 218 The term capacity indicates that certain "case[s]
can turn on the probable consequences [the junior] use will have [on] the famous
mark., 219

The

term

capacity

contemplates

future,

as well

as present,

connotations. 22° Accordingly, dilution occurs if a famous mark's power to identify
and distinguish products will be diminished.221

Justice Kennedy's statements are consistent with the likelihood of dilution
standard, rather than the actual dilution standard the majority opinion proffers.
The thrust of Justice Kennedy's argument is that "[t]he essential role of injunctive
222

relief is to 'prevent future wrong, although no right has yet been violated.'
Accordingly, in Justice Kennedy's view, injunctive relief should be allowed before
any damage to the distinctiveness of the mark has occurred.223

217. Id. at 434.
218. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. Id.
221. Id. The concurring opinion further stated, "[i]f a mark will erode or lessen the power of the
famous mark ... the elements of dilution may be established." Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
222. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 436 (quoting Swift & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928)) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
223. Id. Justice Kennedy correctly set forth the purpose behind injunctive relief in his concurring
opinion.
However, the majority opinion clearly provided that "[the] text [of the FTDA]
unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution." Id. at 433.
Some commentators have mistakenly relied on the concurring opinion, proposing that an injunction
may still be had if the junior use will dilute the senior mark. Kitterman, supra n. 11, at 6 ("showing
actual dilution is not always a prerequisite for relief, because the FTDA also provides for preventative
injunctions to stop dilution before it occurs. Justice Kennedy took pains to highlight that fact in his
concurring opinion, in which he agreed that actual dilution is required for an FTDA violation but
noted that the FTDA also provides for [a preventive] injuncti[on] ....). While 15 U.S.C. § 1116 may
provide for an injunction to prevent a violation of the FTDA, the Court in Moseley has unanimously
held that in order to obtain such an injunction a plaintiff must prove "actual dilution." Moseley, 537
U.S. at 433. Moreover, Justice Kennedy merely stated that "[t]he Court's opinion does not foreclose
injunctive relief if [Victoria's Secret] on remand present[s] sufficient evidence of [dilution]." Id. at 436
(Kennedy, J., concurring). This statement does not mean that a plaintiff may forego proving the
requisite elements of the statute in order to obtain the provided relief. In addition, the authority of
concurring and dissenting opinions when they are in direct conflict with the majority opinion is
questionable. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 997, 1002-03 (D.S.C. 1995)
(When a majority opinion "is silent [on an issue,].. . [t]he opinion must be read as a whole, including
any concurring and dissenting opinions.") (emphasis added); Milkiewicz v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
963 F. Supp. 1150, 1155-56 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (in the context of a plurality decision the district court
refused to combine a dissent and a concurrence to create a majority opinion). While Justice Kennedy's
concurrence is more logical than the rest of the Moseley decision, the majority opinion still controls.
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THE "SECRET" IS OUT
IV. A

PLAINTIFF UNDER MOSELEY AND THE

FTDA Is

LEFT WITHOUT

A LEGAL OR EQUITABLE REMEDY

In the aftermath of the Moseley quagmire, the plaintiff in a federal dilution
claim must show actual consummated harm in order to obtain injunctive relief. If
the plaintiff succeeds in showing actual dilution, but fails in showing willful intent,
he may obtain only an injunction and will not be compensated for economic
loss. 224 A logical result would be to allow the damages provided for under section

1117(a) without having to show willful intent and to issue injunctions according to
a likelihood of dilution standard.
A.

Trademark Owners Should Be Allowed Damages ForA Violation Of The
FTDA, Even In The Absence of Willful Intent

The purpose of damages is compensation. 225 Generally, this purpose is
achieved after the plaintiff has proven a right to damages in a particular cause of
action.226 A clear case for damages might be where a plaintiff establishes that a
228
defendant set fire to his house227 and caused the value of the house to decrease.
' 229
The compensation might be measured by the "cost of repair , or "the diminished
value of the house. 23 °

Awarding damages in this instance is consistent with the theory that "[t]he

224. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2).
225. Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 1. While damages may have other purposes as well, e.g.,
punishment via punitive damages, "compensation is professedly its main purpose." Id. This note will
not address any specific type of damages in depth, but will merely seek to demonstrate the overall
purpose of damages. It has been well established that "[t]he fundamental principle of damages is to
restore the injured party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been
for the wrong of the other party." U.S. v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958); Hill v. Varner,
290 P.2d 448, 449 (Utah 1955): Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 241 P.2d 914, 920 (Utah 1952). Other
commentators have researched the principles of damages and found similar results. Douglas Laycock,
Modem American Remedies: Cases and Materials12-19,128-44 (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1994).
In addition, other commentators have stated that the policy behind damages in the context of
tort or contract is to compensate the injured plaintiff. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 25 (2003). Damages
replace what the plaintiff lost in terms of dollars. Laycock, supra at 16. Thus, "[tihe purpose of an
award is to make the aggrieved party whole to the extent that it is possible to measure [the] injury in
terms of money." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 27 (2003) (footnotes omitted). The purpose of damages
has also been phrased as "to restore the injured party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would
have been in had it not been for the wrong of the other party." Hatahley, 257 F.2d at 923; Laycock,
supra at 12, 15. Moreover, whenever an innocent party's right has been violated, the law presumes that
there has been damage, and thus, the injured party has a right to nominal damages. Simpkins v. Ryder
Freight Sys. Inc., 855 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Mo. App. 1993); 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 5. However,
pecuniary damages must be proven. Simpkins, 855 S.W.2d at 416, 423; 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 5.
226. Schonfeld v. Hilliard,218 F.3d 164, 177 (2d Cir. 2000) (A plaintiff must prove with "reasonable
certainty" his damages.); Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1985) (The plaintiff must prove
damages.); Simpkins, 855 S.W.2d at 423 ("[D]amages ... are not presumed but must be proven.");
Weaver v. Jordan, 362 S.W.2d 66, 75 (Mo. App. 1962) ("[Tlhe amount and items of pecuniary
damage.., must be proved."); Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 1.
227. This is an extreme example where not only general damages are available, but other special
damages are likely available, along with possible criminal liability on the defendant's part. However,
these considerations are beyond the scope of this paper.
228. Dobbs, Handbook, supran. 110, at 1.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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remedy is merely the means of carrying into effect a substantive principle or
policy." 23 1 Accordingly, the following policy idea should be considered when
selecting a remedy to carry out a substantive principle.232
"Congruence of right and remedy" 233 -the remedy should not encompass
more than the right proven, and neithershould it encompass less than that to which
the plaintiff is entitled.23 4 For example, punitive damages are proper only when
there is willful or wanton conduct.235 On the other hand, nominal damages are not
likely adequate remedies for libel. 36 If a court leaves part of the harm unremedied, the plaintiff has not been made whole.2 37 However, to over-compensate
the plaintiff would result in a windfall. 38
With this principle in mind, it seems that the right and remedy under
Moseley, in the context of a federal trademark dilution action, are not congruent.
Moseley requires a plaintiff to show actual dilution.23' Dilution necessarily
involves some economic injury. 24° Logically, the plaintiff who succeeds in showing
economic harm should receive damages for that economic harm, even in the
absence of willful intent. Generally, willful intent constitutes grounds for punitive

231. Id. at 3. Modern American Remedies notes as a "pervasive point" that "[r]emedies implement
substantive policies." Laycock, supra n. 225, at 142.
232. Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 3-4. Of course more than one policy consideration exists in
the law of damages, however, some of those considerations are beyond the scope of this paper.
233. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). As discussed below, this policy will also apply in the context of
injunctive relief. This policy appears to the author to be a policy applicable to remedies in general.
234. Id. Accordingly, the person determining which remedy is appropriate in a particular case needs
some knowledge of the right involved and its basic purpose. Id. at 3-4. Consider also the following
legal maxim: "ubijus, ibi remedium-where there is a right, there is remedy." Black's Law Dictionary
1695 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999).
235. Id. at 4. Punitive damages operate "to condemn seriously bad conduct." Dobbs, supra n. 110, at
218. The questioned conduct "must involve some bad state of mind." Id.
236. Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 4. It is not argued that for every act of libel, nominal
damages would not be an adequate remedy. The purpose of this statement is merely to demonstrate a
general point, not to make an in-depth analysis of the law concerning libelous acts.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 4-5. Traditionally, plaintiffs have argued that their right and remedy, or "'[their]
rightful position' . . . [is founded] on corrective justice." Laycock, supra n. 225, at 16-17. If a court
restores a wronged plaintiff, the suffering can be eliminated. Id. However, "[t]o do less would leave
part of the harm unremedied; to do more would confer a windfall gain." Id. Yet,
this
idea
of
congruent remedies is sometimes qualified by a second policy consideration, "Administrative
Convenience." Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 4-5. There are, of course, other policies that might
limit the congruence of right and remedr policy. One commentator notes that "no matter how well
settled [any remedial principle may be], [such principles] may have to be adapted or limited when
applied in the context of a particular substantive violation."
Laycock, supra n. 225, at 142.
Administrative convenience is a factor since many times courts hesitate to enforce remedies that are
too time consuming or are too complicated to administrate. Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 4-5.
For example, courts hardly enforce building and repair contracts by mandatory injunctions because of
the time and complications involved. Id. at 5. Courts prefer practical and measurable remedies. Id. In
the context of a building contract breach, a proper remedy might be the difference in contract price in
the new contract as compared to the old contract. See id.
239. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
240. Oral Arguments at 28, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418. While the Court never explicitly says this in its
opinion, this requirement is implicit when read along with the courts statement of the issue, "whether
objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of a famous mark ... is ... [required] for relief
under the FTDA." Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422. Moreover, the Justices stipulate in the oral arguments
that dilution involves economic harm: "[D]ilution . . . of course, entails economic injury." Oral
Arguments at 28, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
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damages.24

Thus, to allow damages only when a plaintiff proves bad or willful

intent would be inadequate compensation.
Moreover, a major reason Congress had for enacting the FTDA was that
242
state remedies were inadequate for trademark owners in the context of dilution.
Furthermore, half of the states, at the time of the enactment of the FTDA, did not
recognize a cause of action for dilution.2 43 The legislative history provides that

"dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the
advertising value of the mark." 244 This infection is substantially different from the
other type of immediate injuries that occur to trademarks under 15 U.S.C. §
1125.245 Based on these findings, Congress concluded that this substantially
different cause of action needed a different remedy. 246 However, Moseley is in
accord with neither the legislative history of the FTDA nor the accepted law of

damages.While the Court maintains that consequences of the economic harm, i.e., lost
247
profits or sales, need not be proven, it remains to be seen how one could show
248
economic harm without showing some kind of economic consequences.

Nevertheless, in the midst of a purported effort to lower the burden on the
plaintiff, the Court subsequently says that a lack of "direct evidence ... such as
consumer surveys," 249 cannot be overlooked merely because such evidence is
difficult to obtain.25 0 Evidence of damages, such as consumer surveys and other

kinds of reports, often go to the proof of value or certainty of the harm done. 251 It
comes as no surprise that certainty, some "factual basis" on which courts can
assess the harm 2 is a principle associated with damages. 3 Recovery of damages
as compensation is reasonable if the plaintiff can prove, and moreover is required
to prove, such damages.

In other cases, the Court has awarded damages to economically injured

241. See Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 4.
242. H.R. Rep. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
243. Id.
244. Id. (quoting Mortellito v. Nina of Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
245. Id. In trademark infringement, one type of injury occurs when a pirate or cheat sells products
using another's mark, such as the Nike "Swoosh" as a label. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). This produces
immediate injury. See H.R. Rep. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
246. See H.R. Rep. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030). It is noteworthy that the
remedy Congress had in mind was a "nationwide basis" for protection of trademarks by prohibiting
trademark dilution. Id. at 1030-31. In other words, the remedy Congress intended was a preventive
injunction. However, Moseley requires a plaintiff to prove the substantive right to damages, i.e.,
"actual injury to the economic value of a famous mark." Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422.
247. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
248. Showing economic harm without any kind of economic consequences would most certainly be a
miraculous achievement.
249. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
250. Id.
251. Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 161-62.
252. Id. at 151. In the context of market damages, the measure of damages is often centered on a
loss shown on the balance sheet of the plaintiff. Dobbs, Laws of Remedies, supra n. 110, at 216. See
Taliferro, 757 F.2d at 162 (Merely pulling figures "out of [one's] hat" will not satisfy the quantum of
proof necessary for an award of damages.). Laycock, supra n. 225, at 18.
253. Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 148.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004

21

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 40 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 7
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:155

plaintiffs when such damages were proven with reasonable certainty. 2 4 In
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,2 5 the petitioners ("Bigelow") owned a
theatre in Chicago called "Jackson Park." 6 The respondents ("RKO Pictures")
were multiple motion picture distributors who also owned theatres in the Chicago
film
area.2 17 Bigelow complained that RKO Pictures employed discriminatory
8
income.5
Park's
Jackson
damaged
severely
which
distribution practices,
The films were distributed first to theatres in the "Chicago Loop," which
consisted of all theatres owned by RKO Pictures and other respondents. 59 These
theatres played the motion pictures for the "first run26 a period of one week, or
261
Immediately following the first run was a period of
as long as desired.
"clearance," when the motion pictures could not play in Chicago theatres outside
262
The distribution scheme prevented
the "Loop" for a three-week period.
Jackson Park from playing any films until the general release weeks, ten weeks
263
following the first run.
Bigelow proved that Jackson Park's loss was greater than $120,000 over a
five-year period.2 64 Bigelow offered two types of evidence. 265 First, Bigelow
compared Jackson Park's earnings over the five-year period with the earnings of
Maryland Theatre, one of the respondents' theatres. 266 This comparison revealed
that Maryland Theatre's income exceeded Jackson Park's income by
$115,982.34.67 Second, a comparison of Jackson Park's income between the five-8
year period and the four previous years revealed a drop in income of $125,659.26
The Court found that the respondents' distribution practices caused the damages
and that the evidence proving the damages was sufficient. 60
In awarding damages, the Bigelow Court reasoned that where a plaintiff has
270
In
been wronged, any court's "constant tendency" is to award damages.
addition, the fact that Bigelow could not show Jackson Park's projected income,
absent the discriminatory practices, did not weaken the evidence proffered . 1 The
Court stated that "[tihe most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy

254. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946). For further discussion of Bigelow see
generally Laycock, supra n. 225, at 129-36.
255. 327 U.S. 251.
256. Id. at 253.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 254.
259. Id. at 256.
260. Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 256.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 258.
265. Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 257.
266. Id. at 257-58.
267. Id. at 258.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 266.
270. Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265.
271. Id. at 263-66.
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require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own
wrong has created., 272 Thus, the lack of evidence regarding Jackson Park's
projected income absent the discriminatory practices did not preclude a damages
award.273

The injured party in Bigelow proved damages, and the court awarded
275
In
damages 274 in accordance with the "congruent right and remedy" concept.
sharp contrast to Bigelow, a plaintiff in the context of Moseley and the FTDA
must prove more than what he is entitled to under the FTDA.276 In other words, in
order to obtain an injunction, a plaintiff must prove a right to damages. 77 In order
to obtain damages, a plaintiff must prove willful intent, which arguably justifies
punitive damages.2 78 According to the accepted law of damages, a plaintiff who
proves actual dilution should receive the damages provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
Moreover, the Moseley decision requires the plaintiff to bear the uncertainty of
the defendant's unauthorized use. This is inconsistent with the Court's
admonition in Bigelow that the defendant "shall bear the risk of . .
279

uncertainty.

The concept of awarding damages as compensation for economic injuries is a
well-accepted practice among the courts. 28° In the context of cable television
contracts, courts have awarded damages for economic injuries. 1' In Schonfeld v.
Hilliard,282 the Hilliards formed a company called International News Network,
Inc. ("INN"). 283 The Hilliards negotiated with Schonfeld, creator and past
president of Cable News Network, to join their company as a shareholder. 284 INN
subsequently negotiated a supply agreement with the British Broadcasting
Company ("BBC") for a twenty-year exclusive distribution deal in the United
States for news and information programs.28
Subsequent to the BBC agreement, INN contracted its rights to Cox Cable
Communications ("Cox") for $1.7 million and a five percent equity interest in the
programs. 286 Cox also retained a buy-out option exercisable after ten years based

272. Id. at 265 (citation omitted).
273. Id. at 265-66.
274. Id. at 266.
275. See Dobbs, Handbook, supra n. 110, at 3.
276. It is again noteworthy to point out that in essence, Moseley requires the plaintiff to prove the
right to damages in order to receive a preventive injunction, and the right to punitive damages in order
to receive any damages. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422. This remedy scheme is certainly not congruent with
the plaintiffs right.
277. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34; see supra nn. 225-253, 270-73 and
accompanying text; see infra nn. 309-50 and accompanying text.
278. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); see supra nn. 225-253 and accompanying text.
279. Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265 (citation omitted).
280. Supra nn. 226-27, 233.
281. See Schonfeld, 218 F.3d 164.

282. 218 F.3d 164.
283. Id. at 168.

284. Id.
285. Id. at 169.

286. Id.
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on twenty percent of the tenth year's gross income.287 Subsequent to making the
deal with Cox, the Hilliards decided to keep the rights under the BBC supply
agreement. 2
After the Hilliards failed to produce the agreed amount of funding, the BBC
agreement fell through. 2s9 Schonfeld then brought a claim against the Hilliards
seeking lost profits and assets under the BBC supply agreement.2 9 The court held
that Schonfeld did not have sufficient evidence to establish lost profits, but could
establish lost assets. 29' The court premised its discussion of damages by setting
forth some general principles of damages. 292 The court noted that "damages may
not be merely speculative, possible or imaginary.'

. .

. [T]hey must be 'capable of

measurement based upon known reliable factors without undue speculation.2 93
Thus, the court reasoned that lost profits from new businesses should receive
higher scrutiny since they lack a track record with which to measure their
profitability.294
The court noted that while all parties involved felt that the business would be
successful, this belief did not amount to establishing proof of damages. 295 The
court stated that, an "entrepreneur's 'cheerful prognostications' are not enough"
to prove damages.296 Additionally, the court reasoned that all of Schonfeld's
evidence with regard to lost profits was purely "hypothetical., 297 The "seemingly
endless list of assumptions" was not enough to determine lost299
profits. 298 Schonfeld
profits.
lost
of
basis
the
be
could
offered no solid proof, which
However, despite Schonfeld's failure to prove lost profits, he was successful
in proving lost assets. 300 The court reasoned that a supply contract, although
intangible, has a value that can be ascertained. 30 1 The court also noted that the
BBC supply agreement was INN's most valuable asset, aside from bank
accounts.?
The court allowed evidence of the price in the Cox agreement as
reasonable proof of the market value of the BBC agreement.3 3 The Cox
agreement in the context of lost assets provided solid proof of the market value 304

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Schonfeld, 218 F.3d at 169.
Id.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 170-71.
Id. at 172, 178, 183.
Schonfeld, 218 F.3d at 172-74.
Id. at 172 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id.; Dobbs, Handbook,surpa n. 111, at 158.
Schonfeld, 218 F.3d at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id. at 177.
Schonfeld, 218 F.3d at 177.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
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as opposed to a mere projection of lost profits.30 5 The court based this conclusion
6
on the fact that Cox was an experienced and a well-informed industry leader.?
As in Bigelow and Schonfeld, Victoria's Secret in Moseley was required to
show "actual injury to the economic value, 3 7 of its business, and therefore prove
the negative impact on its trademark. Unfortunately, the Court's discussion of
actual dilution sheds little, if any, light as to exactly what proof is necessary.
Nevertheless, even if Victoria's Secret had made such a showing, the only remedy
available would have been an injunction.3°s This is inconsistent with the principles
of damages discussed above. In addition, this result is inconsistent with the
purpose of injunctive relief. Therefore, a look at injunctive relief is in order.
B.

Injunctions Should Be Issued Based On A Likelihood Of Dilution Standard

In contrast to damages, the purpose of an injunction is usually preventive in
nature. 309 However, an injunction may also mandate certain acts by the defendant
in order to remedy any wrong committed against the rights of an innocent party.310
A preventive injunction, however, seeks to stop future injurious acts before they
occur 31 and thus, is improper unless there is a real threat of harm. 31 Accordingly,
preventive injunctions merely preserve the status quo3a3 as opposed to correcting a
314
past wrong.

305. Id. at 173-74.
306. Id. at 180.
307. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422.
308. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)-(2).
309. U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) ("The purpose of an injunction is to prevent
future violations ...." (quoting Swift & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. at 326)); U.S. v. Or. St. Med. Socy., 343
U.S. 326, 333 (1952) ("The sole function of an action for injunction is to forestall future violations.");
Swift & Co., 276 U.S. at 326 (1928) ("A suit for an injunction deals primarily, not with past violations,
but with threatened future ones .... ");Farmland Dairies v. McGuire, 789 F. Supp. 1243, 1250
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("An injunction can be issued only to prevent existing or presently threatened
injuries."); Putnam v. Fortenberry, 589 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Neb. 1999) ("The purpose of an injunction is
to restrain actions that have not yet been taken."); Koenig v. S.E. Community College, 438 N.W.2d 791,
794 (Neb. 1989); Babcock v. St. FrancisMed. Ctr., 543 N.W.2d 749, 756 (Neb. App. 1996); Cross v. City
of Lawton, 119 P. 625, 625 (Okla. 1911) ("The function of a writ of injunction is to afford preventive
relief .... This is alphabetical law." (quoting City of Alma v. Loehr, 22 P. 424, 424 (Kan. 1889)));
Robert Henley Eden, Waterman's Eden on the Law and Practiceof Injunctions vol. 1, 2 (3d ed., Banks,
Gould & Co. 1852); Dobbs, supra n. 110, at 163-64. Other commentators have found similar results.
Laycock, supra n. 225, at 230-31.
310. 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 1 (2000). Injunctions requiring certain acts are termed mandatory
injunctions. Id.
311. See generally Eden, supra n. 309, at 2; 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 1.
312. 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions §§ 1, 32.
313. Id. at § 4; see Laycock, supra n. 225, at 231 (Injunctions seek to preserve the plaintiff in the
rightful position.). Intuitively, once a plaintiff has been put out of his rightful position by the
defendant's wrong, an injunction which preserves the status quo cannot fully compensate that plaintiff.
See supra nn. 233-38 and accompanying text; infra n. 314.
314. Putnam, 589 N.W.2d at 843 ("Since the purpose of an injunction is not to afford a remedy for
what is past but to prevent future mischief, . . .rights already lost and wrongs already perpetrated
cannot be corrected by injunction.") (citation omitted); 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 2.
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Additionally, an injunction is proper if the party seeking relief has a valid
"interest or title" in a protected right. 15 Moreover, when statutes specifically
authorize injunctions, "[c]ourts should not seek to apply their equitable discretion
to grant an injunction when such discretion is explicitly precluded by use of the
word 'shall' or similarly prescriptive statutory language. 3 16 In this situation, the
courts should consider only whether there is a statutory violation and whether
potential injuries are probable. 3" Accordingly, such requests for statutory
to the statutory requirements, as opposed to normal
injunctions issue pursuant
318
considerations of equity.

The purpose of the injunction provided for under the FTDA is consistent
with the above principles.319

According to the FFDA, an injunction shall be

awarded under 15 U.S.C. § 1116. Section 1116 provides for injunctions to prevent
a violation of the FTDA. A fair reading of the legislative history most certainly
reveals that Congress did have in mind a preventive measure in protecting famous
trademarks from dilution.32 °
Nevertheless, under Moseley a plaintiff must show actual harm,321 instead of

the usual threat of future harm. While a preventive injunction might be useful to
prohibit the ongoing dilution, such an injunction by its very nature cannot
compensate the plaintiff for past wrongs.322 Once the famous mark is diluted, it is
32
too late for an injunction to make the plaintiff whole; the harm has been done.

When an unauthorized subsequent use dilutes the famous mark by "reduc[ing] the
public's perception that the mark signifies something unique, singular, or
particular, '3 24 the harm has been done. For example, while "Rolls-Royce" now

stands for something unique, once it is misappropriated 100 or 1,000 times, the
mark is no longer distinctive. 32' This is a total loss of distinctiveness; it is the
315. 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 17. Today, an injunction is a proper remedy for infringement on
property rights, such as "trespass, waste, and nuisance" cases, or infringement of economic rights, such
as "patents, trademarks[,]and copyrights." Dobbs, supra n. 110, at 168 (emphasis added). However,
injunctions are not limited to these cases. See Eden, supra n. 309, at 10 to 11-4.
316. 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 23.
317. Id.
318. Abdo v. IRS, 234 F. Supp. 2d 553, 564 (M.D.N.C. 2002). ("An injunction may issue without
resort to the traditional equitable prerequisites if a statute expressly authorizes the injunction."); 42
Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 23. Some considerations in issuing an injunction include: achieving a cost
benefit balance between monetary and non-monetary costs, and considering alternative remedies. See
Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials 405-06 (3d ed., Aspen 2002). In
weighing alternative remedies, if a court finds that the benefits would be substantially reduced by the
costs, a legal remedy may be more appropriate. Id. However, as stated above, when an injunction is
provided for by statute with prescriptive language, the statutory provisions should control. Abdo, 234
F. Supp. 2d at 564; 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 23.
319. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116, 1125(c); supra n. 309 and accompanying text.
320. H.R. Rep. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
321. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
322. See Putnam, 589 N.W.2d at 843.
323. Oral Arguments at 37, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
324. Oral Arguments at 33, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418; H.R. Rep. 104-374 at 3 (reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030).
325. Oral Arguments at 24, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418. Note that Congress defined dilution as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services." 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (emphasis added). Congress did not define dilution as the total diminution of the capacity to
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infection Congress sought to prevent with the FIDA. However, in spite of
Congress' intent, Moseley and the FTDA leave a plaintiff with inadequate
protection.
Courts often struggle with whether or not injunctive relief is an appropriate
or sufficient remedy for harm. However, in the context of statutory injunctions, it
is Congress that makes that determination and the courts that follow. The United
States Supreme Court did follow Congress' determination in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 26 a case concerning preservation of Percina tanasi, or perch.327

In Tennessee Valley, the Court using the Endangered Species Act of 1973
("ESA"), statutorily enjoined Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA"), a United
States government-owned corporation, from operating a nearly complete federal
dam. 3288 According to that act, "all federal agencies [were mandated] 'to insure
that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the

continued existence' of an endangered329species or 'result in the destruction or
modification of habitat of such species. ,
TVA was ready to operate the dam,330 and Congress had allocated and
expended over $100 million for the dam's construction."' The dam would have

created a thirty-mile-long water reservoir along the Little Tennessee River near
where it connects to the Big Tennessee River.332 This reservoir would have
completely destroyed the habitat of the perch.333 The Court found that the ESA
statute required the use of the dam to be enjoined.3 3

The Court reasoned that Congress placed preserving wildlife as a high
priority as evidenced in the ESA. 335 Furthermore, in the U.S. "tripartite"
336
In
governmental system, the courts are to enforce the laws Congress sets forth.

This example
identify or distinguish, which is what the Rolls-Royce example demonstrates.
demonstrates why it is very important to stop the first dilutive use. Consider the "Tiffany's" jewelry
store example for instance. Oral Arguments at 32, Moseley, 537 U.S. 418. "If you can have a Tiffany's
Restaurant, then you can also have a Tiffany Shoe Store, a Tiffany Pet Store .... Where will it all
end?" Id. Intellectual property attorneys are now faced with the fact that:
[T]here are users popping up all over the country all of the time, so that if the first user, say
Victor's Little Secret, exists in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, and if you can't show that that
alone produces the kind of harm you're looking... for-how can you stop the second, the
third, the 500th use? ...By the time you could show economic damage to the [mark], first of
all as a matter of law you might have lost the status as a famous mark because there are all
those users out there. Secondly,... it is not clear why you would prohibit the 500th user of
the mark, the 500th different kind of store when you allowed the first 499 to go on.
Id. at 38.
326. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
327. Id. at 158-59. Percinatanasi is a specific type of perch, approximately three inches long and tancolored, called the snail darter. Id.
328. Id. at 172.
329. Id. at 173.
330. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 170.
331. Id. at 172.
332. Id. at 157.
333. Id. at 161.
334. Id. at 172-73.
335. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 194.
336. Id.
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addition, the Court noted that "[w]hile '[i]t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is,' . . . it is equally-and
emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress ... to formulate legislative

policies.0 337 The statute contained plain language clearly prohibiting any act
jeopardizing an endangered species.338

Congress placed a higher priority on the endangered species than on the
public funds that would be wasted by the non-use of the dam. 339 The Court noted
that its views regarding the astuteness of a purposeful course by Congress should
not be considered in the interpretation of a statute.
When the meaning and
constitutionality of a statute is ascertained, the judicial procedure halts. 34' Thus,
while the District Court found that enjoining the use of the dam would be an
unreasonable
result, 342 the Supreme Court found that the ESA compelled an
injunction. 34
343
Accordingly, the Court in Tennessee Valley issued a statutory injunction
when equitable considerations might not have allowed an injunction. 344 Similar to
the ESA, the FFDA provides for a statutory injunction. 345 While the FTDA
provides that an injunction should issue in accordance with equity, 346 it also
contains "prescriptive language '' 34 7 indicating a mandatory issuance of an
injunction. 3 Thus, it is a reasonable conclusion that the standard for obtaining an
injunction should be a likelihood of dilution. A likelihood of dilution standard
would be in accord with principles of injunctive relief349 and with the FTDA's
mandatory prescriptive language.35 °
V.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE

FTDA

On April 22, 2004, Congress heard testimony from Jacqueline A. Leimer,
President of the International Trademark Association ("INTA"), regarding

337. Id. (citations omitted).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 177-79, 185, 194.
340. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 194.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 166.
343. Id. at 172-73.
344. See supra n. 318.
345. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
346. Id.
347. 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 23.
348. Id.;supran. 318.
349. Supra n. 309 and accompanying text. Consider the following quote from Weaver regarding the
purpose of equity:
Equity is reluctant to permit a wrong to be suffered without remedy. It seeks to do justice
and is not bound by strict common law rules or the absence of precedents. It looks to the
substance rather than the form and will not sanction an unconscionable result merely
because it may have been brought about by means which simulate legality. And once
rightfully possessed of a case it will not relinquish it short of doing complete justice.
362 S.W.2d at 75 (emphasis added).
350. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 23; supra n. 318.
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possible amendments to the F'DA.351 Recently, INTA published an article,
which summarizes its recommendations to Congress. INTA's article expressly
agrees with this note regarding the standard for injunctive relief,352 According to
INTA:
[Tihe Supreme Court's decision does not account for the practical need to prevent
dilution at its incipiency; the owner of a famous mark should be able to obtain an
injunction against the first offending use and should not be required to wait until
mark is permanently
multiple third party uses compound the harm such that the.
impaired. 353

INTA 4believes that a likelihood of dilution is the best standard for injunctive
35
relief.
In addition, the standard for awarding damages should also be changed. As
the United States Supreme Court has stated, "'[t]he constant tendency of the
courts is to find some way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has
been done. Difficulty of ascertainment is no longer confused with right of
recovery' for a proven invasion of the plaintiff's rights., 355 As long as a sufficient
basis for damages
has been proven, damages should be awarded without requiring
356
willful intent.
The following suggestions would help align the FTDA with both the
accepted law of damages and injunctions. 3 7 The phrase "causes dilution" should
be substituted with the phrase "and there is a likelihood of dilution." Such a
change would align the FTDA with the accepted law of injunctions since an
injunction could issue to prevent harm. In addition, the provision requiring there
to be willful intent in order to obtain damages should be removed. Instead, the
FTDA should allow the plaintiff to be compensated for economic injury if the
necessary proof is set forth. Such an amendment would provide adequate
compensation and protection to the trademark owner.
VI. CONCLUSION

The principles of damages and injunctions discussed above make it apparent
that the Supreme Court in Moseley and the language of the FTDA have
debilitated the usefulness and purpose of the act. As noted before, Congress
intended a national remedy, 359 allowing the owner of a famous trademark more

351. Dinisa L. Hardley, INTA Speaks Out on U.S. Dilution Issue, INTA Spec. Rpt. (newsletter of
INTA) 1 (June 15, 2004). This hearing before Congress took place while this note was waiting to be
published,
352. Id. at 1-2.
353. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
354. Id. at 2.
355. Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265-66 (quoting Story ParchmentCo. v. PatersonParchment Paper Co., 282
U.S. 555, 565-66 (1931)).
356. See discussion on damages in Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 266.
357. An amendment proposal is provided in Appendix A.
358. Note that there are also adequate exceptions for First Amendment rights.
359. H.R. Rep. 104-374 at 2-3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1029-30).
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protection from "pirates and cheats '' 360 and their attempts to dilute famous
marks.361 Unfortunately, Congress was not as careful with its word choice as Mark
Twain might have been, and that was the difference between "lightning and a
lighting bug., 362 Nevertheless, the FTDA's inconsistencies and the inequities in
Moseley can be resolved with an amendment. Such an amendment should allow
damages without proving willful intent and allow an injunction to be issued in
accordance with a likelihood of dilution standard. This would provide the plaintiff
with a congruent right and remedy.
R. Landon Dirickson*

360. 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1274.
361. H.R. Rep. 104-374 at 2-3 (reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1029-30).
362. The Quotations Page, supra n. 1.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Tulsa College of Law (expected May 2005); B.B.A., Belmont
University (2002). I thank my family and friends for all their support. I give special thanks to my
mother and father for all their love and support throughout the years.
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APPENDIX

A363

ProposedAmendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c):
(c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks
(1)The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable,
to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce
of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes dilution there is a likelihood of dilution of to the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain damages and such other
relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining whether a mark is
distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not
limited to (A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark,
whether by owner or by thirdparties;3
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by
third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous
and distinctive mark or trade name shall be entitled on4y to injunctive
relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title. unless the person against

whomn the injunction is soug ht willfully intended to trade on the awnier's
reputation or to cause dilution of the famouts mnark. if sueh willfuil intent
is-prven, the In addition, the owner of the famous mark shall alse be
entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of this
title, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity.

363. Italicized phrases represent language that should be added to the FTDA in place of the
language which has been crossed out.
364. The italicized portion of (c)(1)(C) was part of a proposal by INTA to assist in determining the
fame of a mark. See Hardley, supra n. 351, at 2 (regarding the INTA drafted language).
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(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with
respect to that mark, that is brought by another person under the
common law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of
the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods
or services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
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